The Promise of an Automated Migration Policy
On Planning an Information System in the Swiss Federal Administration in the 1960s
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- Author: Moritz Mähr
- Title: The Promise of an Automated Migration Policy: On Planning an Information System in the Swiss Federal Administration in the 1960s
- In: Paolo Bory, Daniela Zetti (eds.), Digital Federalism Information, Institutions, Infrastructures (1950-2000), Itinera 49, Schwabe, 2022, pp. 60-89
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4509-2
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60 Article
The promise of an automated migration policy:
on planning an information system in the
Swiss federal administration in the 1960s*
Moritz Mähr
Abstract
This article examines the planning of the Central Aliens Register in Switzerland from
1964 to 1971. This first national information system was designed to support the migra-
tion policy of the federal administration in such a way that foreign workers were dis-
tributed fairly among the cantons according to economic and demographic needs. Al-
though it only fulfilled its original purpose to a limited extent, within a few years it
became an important tool of the Federal Aliens Police and remained in operation until
2008. From the outset, this new sociotechnical infrastructure led to a conflict between the
federal status quo and an automated, centrally controlled migration regime. The article
analyzes how the federal migration regime in Switzerland responded to the tension be-
tween automation and federalism.
Since the commission began its work, the nature and scope of immigration have
changed considerably. The problem of foreign workers has also undergone a funda-
mental change in public opinion. While previously the large influx of foreign work-
ers was widely regarded as desirable, even necessary, because it was conducive to the
growth of our economy, recently there has also been a growing awareness of the
disadvantages and dangers of this development.1
Introduction
In a period of strong economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, Switzerland
faced a complex mix of political developments. The economy promoted a
massive influx of labor migrants, and cantons issued work and residence per-
* Many thanks to Lucas Federer, Henrike Hoffmann, and Philipp Krauer for their
valuable comments on the manuscript.
1 Bericht der Studienkommission für das Problem der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte,
Bern 1964, p. 8 (author’s translation).
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 61
mits accordingly. Between 1960 and 1965 alone, the share of foreigners
among the population rose from 10 % to almost 15 %. The steep rise fueled
fears of wage dumping among trade unions and of «over-foreignization»
(Überfremdung) among right-wing nationalists. Meanwhile, Italy, the coun-
try of origin of most migrants, increased pressure on Switzerland to improve
poor working conditions and access to the social security system. Right-wing
nationalists attempted to radically cap the percentage of foreigners in the
population through a series of popular initiatives. The chances of success of
these initiatives were good, and many employers feared the economic conse-
quences. In order not to jeopardize the supply of skilled labor, the Federal
Council increasingly intervened in the competencies of the cantons and at-
tempted to centrally control the migration regime.2
The migration regime of the 1960s was a federal patchwork. Under the
provisions of the Swiss constitution, cantons could issue work, settlement,
and residence permits at their own discretion. Cantons with seasonally fluc-
tuating labor demands (such as tourism, the construction industry, and agri-
culture) issued short-term permits valid for only a few months. At the end of
the season, these workers would go back to their families and home countries
before returning to Switzerland for the following season. Living and working
conditions were often precarious: there was no statutory unemployment in-
surance, no minimum wage, and no support for integration. Cantons with a
high demand for skilled workers issued longer-term work and settlement
permits, allowed family reunification, and ensured swift integration.
The migration authorities were also very heterogeneously structured. In
the canton of Basel City, where demand for skilled workers was high, the
various authorities were combined in a well-organized office; in other can-
tons, authorities were involved at the cantonal and municipal levels. These
differences meant that it was difficult to collect consistent statistics on the
labor market and demographics at the national level. Some cantons reported
figures to the administration from the cantonal alien police offices or em-
ployment offices, while others reported figures from resident registration of-
2 Peter Hablützel, Peter Gilg, Beschleunigter Wandel und neue Krisen (seit 1945), in:
Beatrix Mesmer et al. (eds.), Geschichte der Schweiz und der Schweizer, Basel 1986,
pp. 821–891.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
62 Moritz Mähr
fices. There was no clear overview that would allow coordination of the can-
tonal migration regimes. With the new nationwide restrictive measures in-
troduced in 1970, the Federal Council broke with the status quo and upset
the balance between the federal administration and the cantons. An auto-
mated information system, in which all aliens were to be recorded, was to
statistically underpin the new policy and give it more legitimacy.
This article examines the planning of the Central Aliens Register (ZAR)
information system from 1964 to 1971 to show how federal migration policy
in Switzerland dealt with the tension between the federal status quo and au-
tomation. Sources from the Federal Archives in Bern are examined. They
document the negotiation process between the federal administration and
the cantons in this information infrastructure project. Our research shows
that the historical development of Swiss migration policy and related govern-
ment actions requires analysis of technical and organizational artifacts. Two
concepts are of central importance: migration regimes and infrastructure.
According to Lucassen, Hoerder, and Lucassen, migration regimes are a set
of institutions and policies designed to restrict or facilitate the spatial move-
ment of populations. Star defines information infrastructures as sociotechni-
cal systems that record information about government actions and decisions
and make it accessible to selected parties.3
Gees has shown that labor migration was a driver of European integra-
tion in the 1960s and 1970s. Switzerland was integrated into the Western
European migration system through international treaties and active partici-
pation in international organizations. In his study of the restrictive migration
policy measures, Mülli showed that the negotiation processes of Switzer-
land’s federal migration regime resulted in new, highly technical governancet
techniques. Espahangizi and Mähr have shown that these new techniques
were largely based on statistical and computerized procedures.4
3 Jan Lucassen et al., Terminologien und Konzepte in der Migrationsforschung», in:
Klaus J. Bade et al. (eds.), Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: vom 17. Jahrhundert bis
zur Gegenwart, Paderborn 2007, p. 39; Susan Leigh Star, The Ethnography of Infrastruc-
ture, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 1999, 43: 387.
4 Thomas Gees, Die Schweiz im Europäisierungsprozess. Wirtschafts- und ge-
sellschaftspolitische Konzepte am Beispiel der Arbeitsmigrations-, Agrar- und Wissen-
schaftspolitik, 1947–1974, Zurich 2006; Michael Mülli, Kontingentierung von Migration.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 63
This paper ties in with the history of computing and history of adminis-
trations in nation-states. As Agar has shown for Great Britain and Fleisch-
hack for the Federal Republic of Germany, information systems played a key
role in the administrative activities of the 1960s. For Switzerland, little re-
search has been done on the interaction between computers and administra-
tion. Schwery has shown how the Federal Statistical Office acquired the first
computer for the census in 1960 as an unspectacular replacement investment
for conventional punched card machines, and how the Federal Computing
Center developed from this acquisition. Zetti uses the example of the intro-
duction of electronic data processing in the PTT (postal services, telegraphy,
and telephony) companies at the end of the 1960s to show how staff associa-
tions, project management, the Computing Center, and the general direc-
torate all worked together on the introduction of the computer to promote
their own agendas. Gugerli and Bächi analyzed the PTT’s integrated
telecommunications system for the management and control of digital com-
munications in the 1960s. Brugger examined how the IT project to introduce
the new social security number in the 1970s changed organizational develop-
ment within the federal administration. Koller examined the digitization of
the federal administration using the example of ZAR, thus providing impor-
tant preliminary work for this paper.5
Zur Soziologie einer Regierungstechnik, in: Lucien Criblez et al. (eds.), Staatlichkeit in der
Schweiz: regieren und verwalten vor der neoliberalen Wende, Historische Bildungs-
forschung, Vol. 2, Zurich 2016, pp. 171–191; Kijan Espahangizi, Moritz Mähr, The Mak-
ing of a Swiss Migration Regime: Electronic Data Infrastructures and Statistics in the Fed-
eral Administration, 1960s–1990s, in: Journal of Migration History, 2020, 6(3): 379–404;
Moritz Mähr, Kijan Espahangizi, Computing Aliens. From Central Control to Migration
Scenarios, 1960–1990, in: Monika Dommann et al. (eds.), Data Centers: Edges of a
Wired Nation, Zurich 2020.
5 Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer,
History of Computing, Cambridge, MA 2003; Julia Fleischhack, Eine Welt im Daten-
rausch. Computeranlagen und Datenmengen als gesellschaftliche Herausforderung in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1965–1975), Zurich 2016, p. 22; Nick Schwery, Die Mas-
chine regieren. Computer und eidgenössische Bundesverwaltung, 1958–1965, Preprints
zur Kulturgeschichte der Technik, 2018 (29), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000243303 (3/
2/2021); Daniela Zetti, Die Erschliessung der Rechenanlage. Computer im Postcheckdi-
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
64 Moritz Mähr
The first section of this article presents the historical context, the key
players in the federal administration, and their agenda. The second section
examines the minutes of the Expert Commission for Statistics on Foreigners
and the expectations of the various stakeholders regarding the information
system. The third section analyzes the final report of the Expert Commission.
In this context, focus is placed on questions that were not clarified during the
negotiation process in the Expert Commission. The fourth section shows
how the Federal Council took back control of the project in response to ten-
sions between the federal administration and the cantons and municipalities.
The fifth section outlines the course of the pilot phase and shows how con-
sidering technical and organizational artifacts underscores the interdepen-
dence of automation and federalism. The conclusion summarizes the argu-
ment and suggests further research questions.
Statistics for growth and against fear
of over-foreignization
As early as the beginning of the 1960s, Max Holzer, director of the Swiss
Federal Employment Office, was convinced that Swiss labor market policy
had to undergo fundamental changes. The system of «guest workers» was
long regarded as a guarantee of low wage costs and as an implicit economic
buffer. If economic growth were to slow down, residence permits would not
enst, 1964–1974, in: Gisela Hürlimann et al. (eds.), Gesteuerte Gesellschaft – Orienter la
société, Zurich 2009, pp. 88–101; David Gugerli, «Nicht überblickbare Möglichkeiten».
Kommunikationstechnischer Wandel als Kollektiver Lernprozess, 1960–1985, Preprints
Zur Kulturgeschichte Der Technik, 2001 (15), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004254297
(3/2/2021); Beat Bächi, Kommunikationstechnologischer und sozialer Wandel. «Der sch-
weizerische Weg zur digitalen Kommunikation» (1960–1985), Preprints zur Kul-
turgeschichte der Technik, 2002(16): 85, https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004465764 (3/2/
2021); Jérôme Brugger, At the Dawn of Swiss E-Government: Planning and Use of a Uni-
que Identifier in the Public Administration in the 1970s, in: Administration & Society,
2018, 50(9): 1319–1334; Guido Koller, The Central Register of Foreigners. A Short Histo-
ry of Early Digitisation in the Swiss Federal Administration, in: Media in Action, 2017(1):
81–92, https://www001.zimt.uni-siegen.de/ojs/index.php/mia/article/view/6 (3/2/2021).
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 65
be issued. This would reduce the supply of labor, which in turn would have a
positive effect on the unemployment rate.6
The recruitment areas for cheap labor were increasingly extended to
avoid rising wage claims in the countries of origin. While in the 1950s work-
ers were mainly recruited from neighboring countries and southern Western
Europe, in the 1960s Switzerland was also recruiting in Greece, Yugoslavia,
and Turkey. At the same time, Italy was demanding better working condi-
tions for its citizens and access to the Swiss social security system, permanent
right of settlement, and simplified family reunification.7
Holzer assumed that at some point Switzerland would give in to these
demands. The proportion of foreigners in the permanent resident population
would then increase and would stabilize at a high level. Family reunification
would lead to demographic shifts and make many new homes, schools, hos-
pitals, and transportation services necessary. In order to study this scenario
scientifically and to derive specific policies, Holzer suggested to the Depart-
ment of Economic Affairs in 1961 that a study commission be set up. Holzer
himself was appointed chairman of the subsequent commission to study «the
problem of foreign workers».8
The government’s issue with foreign workers was that future migration
policy had to reconcile the conflicting claims of various political groups. On
the one hand, the rapidly growing economy demanded more and more
cheap labor. On the other hand, trade unions and national-conservative
groups feared the economic consequences of migration – inflation, wage
dumping, and housing shortages – and the rationally elusive political and
6 André Holenstein, Mitten in Europa: Verflechtung und Abgrenzung in der Schweiz-
er Geschichte, Zurich 2014, pp. 307–328. A detailed description of the guest worker sys-
tem can be found in Marcel Berlinghoff, Das Ende der «Gastarbeit»: europäische An-
werbestopps 1970–1974, Studien zur historischen Migrationsforschung (SHM), Vol. 27,
Paderborn 2013, pp. 75–97.
7 Matthias Hirt, Die Schweizerische Bundesverwaltung im Umgang mit der Arbeits-
migration: sozial-, kultur-, und staatspolitische Aspekte von 1960 bis 1972, Saarbrücken
2009, pp. 64 ff., 219 ff.; Tobias Senn, Hochkonjunktur, «Überfremdung» und Föderalis-
mus: kantonalisierte Schweizer Arbeitsmigrationspolitik am Beispiel Basel-Landschaft
1945–1975, Zurich 2017, pp. 27–40.
8 Ausländischen Arbeitskräfte.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
66 Moritz Mähr
demographic «danger of over-foreignization». For Holzer, it was obvious
that immigration would have to be restricted in future. But to what extent
immigration could be restricted and whether the «quality» of immigration
could be controlled was unclear. The proportion of foreign workers in labor-
intensive and low-productivity, low-wage sectors such as agriculture was very
high and could be reduced by modernizing machinery without impairing
economic growth. In industry and the service sector, however, the country
was dependent on foreign skilled workers. The government thus had to find
a way of restricting immigration so as to allow the labor market continued
access to skilled workers from abroad without fueling the xenophobic resent-
ment of the population.9
In its influential final report of 1964, which ran to nearly 300 pages, the
study commission made various proposals for reforming labor market policy.
The decentralized control of labor supply by the cantons was felt to be ineffi-
cient. For this reason, the commission argued, the Federal Council should
intervene in the cantons’ competencies to steer them toward a centralized
allocation of work, residence, and settlement permits based on economic and
demographic considerations. To this end, the commission also called for bet-
ter social and labor market statistics. Only with complete, accurate, and regu-
larly collected figures would it be possible to manage labor migration effec-
tively and in a growth-friendly manner. Good figures were increasingly
becoming an important tool for the federal administration; they promised
legitimacy, credibility, and visibility. Statistics served «agenda setting» in the
political debate.10
In late 1964, shortly before the report was published, the issue of labor
migration became a hot topic among the public. Italy had renegotiated the
1948 «emigration agreement» with Switzerland and wrested some conces-
sions from it. Swiss national-conservatives considered the government’s con-
cessions in the area of settlement rights and family reunification excessive.
9 Hablützel, Gilg, Beschleunigter Wandel; Damir Skenderovic, Gianni D’Amato, Mit
dem Fremden politisieren: rechtspopulistische Parteien und Migrationspolitik in der Sch-
weiz seit den 1960er Jahren, Zurich: Chronos 2008, pp. 31–68.
10 Bericht der Studienkommission fü r das Problem der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte,
Bern 1964. Hans Ulrich Jost, Von Zahlen, Politik und Macht: Geschichte der schweiz-
erischen Statistik, Zurich 2016, pp. 5–100.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 67
The National Action against the Over-Foreignization of the People and
Homeland, a right-wing party, began collecting signatures for a popular ini-
tiative to restrict immigration. The so-called over-foreignization initiative
called for limiting the proportion of foreigners in the total population to
10 %. Since almost 15 % of the population were foreigners and the demand
for foreign specialists was still growing, this was a radical proposal.11
The Federal Council was convinced that the consequences of the initia-
tive would be detrimental to the economy and immediately produced a range
of measures. At the end of 1964, the Federal Aliens Police published a set of
social statistics called «over-foreignization statistics», in reference to the
commonly used expression «over-foreignization of the labor market» de-
scribed in contemporary economics. Residence and settlement permits were
used to assess the proportion of foreigners in the resident population. In ad-
dition, the Aliens Police issued circulars to encourage the cantons and com-
munes to standardize the permit and registration processes. The Federal
Council attempted to reduce support for the over-foreignization initiative
among Swiss citizens by means of a particularly high profile policy: in Jan-
uary 1965, it issued a general entry ban for foreigners who could not produce
an employment contract.12
Like the policies of the Federal Council, the debates in parliament and in
the public arena increasingly focused on the available figures. Calls for a
quantitatively measurable restriction on immigration became louder. The
differing survey bases led to the circulation of various, sometimes contradic-
tory, numbers. This created confusion and led to criticism of the Employ-
ment Office’s statistics. Consequently, the Department of Economic Affairs
commissioned the Central Office for Organizational Issues (Organizational
Staff) in April 1965 to review the Employment Office’s statistics.13
The Organizational Staff was a small executive staff attached to the Fed-
eral Council that supervised the Federal Computing Center and coordinated
all of the federal administration’s automation projects. Both its director, Otto
11 Gees, Europäisierungsprozess, pp. 121–135.
12 Hirt, Schweizerische Bundesverwaltung, pp. 54–55.
13 Swiss Federal Archives (BAR), E4300C-01#1998/299#19*, Brief Overview of ZAR’s
History.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
68 Moritz Mähr
Hongler, a lecturer at the Institute of Business Administration at ETH Zurich
and president of the Swiss Society for Rational Administration, and his depu-
ty, Hans Kurt Oppliger, an economist and former employee of the Bull com-
puter company, were advocates of the operations research method of mili-
tary planning. This method assumes that the success of organizational
changes can be measured and mathematically optimized.14
The Organizational Staff considered the current statistics to be insuffi-
cient and supported the plan to collect statistics on foreigners more frequent-
ly and more accurately. However, no one in the federal administration had
any experience with computerized registers and automated statistics of this
magnitude, which were intended for continuous operation. The previous ma-
jor projects of the Computing Center – the population census, the agricultu-
ral business census, and the commercial business census – were one-off sta-
tistical analyses that were planned from scratch every ten years. In addition,
the Organizational Staff were convinced that the legal basis was insufficient
for the continuous collection of data. For this reason, they recommended in
their report that a broad-based expert commission be set up with the partici-
pation of the municipalities and cantons.15
This the Department of Economic Affairs did not do. Instead, it com-
missioned an internal administrative working group consisting of members
of the Statistical Office, the Employment Office, and the Aliens Police to pro-
pose ways of improving the statistics.
The new statistics run on a mainframe computer in Bern
In 1965, this administrative working group started its work under the leader-
ship of Max Baltensperger, head of the section for social statistics at the Sta-
tistical Office. One year later the group presented their initial results. The
14 BAR, E6500–02#1986/114#315*, Expert Report on Improvements in the Govern-
ment Activities and Administrative Management of the Federal Council.
15 BAR, E7170B#1977/67#368*, Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Expert Commission
for Statistics on Foreigners. E6502–02#2002/226#16*, The Initial Situation for the Re-
placement and Enlargement Problem. E6502–02#2002/226#16*, Operating History of the
Computing Center from 1966.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 69
Fig. 1: Punched card (ETH Library Zurich, LBS_SR01–05328).
new statistics were to be run in the Computing Center on mainframe com-
puters as a register of persons and to provide reliable figures at regular inter-
vals. Note that, unlike today’s personal computers, the mainframe computers
available at the time were not operated interactively via screen, keyboard,
and mouse. First, program instructions had to be punched onto cards
(Fig. 1) and transferred to the processor unit (Fig. 2). Then data, also stored
on punched cards or magnetic tape, was processed. Finally, the results were
printed out or transferred to magnetic tape.16
16 BAR, Brief Overview.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
70 Moritz Mähr
Fig. 2: Front view of an IBM System/360 computer (ETH Library Zurich, Com_L19–0071–
0002–0002).
The use of mainframe computers in private and public administration be-
came popular in the 1960s, and statistical analysis was one of the main appli-
cations of these machines. IBM demonstrated the concept to the public with
an art installation at the 1964 National Exhibition. Questionnaires were dis-
tributed in front of a sculpture characterized as a foreigner, and visitors were
asked how much they identified with common stereotypes about the Swiss
on a scale of 1 to 10. The machine-readable questionnaires of almost 600,000
visitors were read by a mainframe computer and compared with each other.
Within a few moments, the computer printed out a result. Visitors could see
for which questions and to what extent their answers deviated from the aver-
age.17
17 René Levy, Gulliver et la politique, in: L’Expo 64, Mémoire Vive, page de l’histoire
lausannoise 9, Lausanne 2000; Koni Weber, Umstrittene Repräsentation der Schweiz:
Soziologie, Politik und Kunst bei der Landesausstellung 1964, Historische Wissens-
forschung 1, Tübingen 2014.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 71
The choice of technology seemed to be obvious for the working group:
automated statistics on a mainframe. However, there was disagreement
about who should run these statistics. No authority possessed the legal com-
petence that would have made the decision obvious. Both the financing and
the legal basis had to be clarified. The Statistical Office and the two closely
cooperating authorities – the Employment Office and the Aliens Police –
wanted to operate the expensive new statistics on foreigners. In order to clar-
ify this issue, an expert commission was to be set up – as requested by the
Organizational Staff a year earlier – with the participation of the municipali-
ties and cantons.
The commission was set up by the Department of Economic Affairs on
24 May 1966. According to the official announcement, the group was tasked
with clarifying whether the planned automation of statistics on foreigners
could be implemented in practice. Under the leadership of Theo Keller, pro-
fessor of economics at the University of St. Gallen, selected officials from sta-
tistical offices, employment offices, resident registration offices, and immi-
gration police authorities from the cantons and municipalities examined the
measures proposed by the working group.18
As an economist, Keller was an expert in quantitative methods. He had
published on the advantages of administrative automation as early as the
1950s. At the end of 1965, as chairman of the Expert Group on Foreign
Workers’ Regulations, Keller had already drafted new restrictive measures
for the Federal Council and had met the head of the Department of Econom-
ic Affairs, Hans Schaffner. In the following years he held key positions in
several of the department’s commissions.19
As director of the Employment Office, Holzer led the commission in a
way that severely limited its scope of action. Over 20 participants attended
commission meetings. Some participants who were also members of the ad-
ministration’s internal working group had already settled on which propos-
als should be more closely examined. Only two meetings were scheduled –
18 BAR, E7001C#1978/59#954*, Report of the Expert Commission for Statistics on
Foreigners.
19 Theo Keller, Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Automation, in: Schweizerische
Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 1958(I-3): 48–67.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
72 Moritz Mähr
one in August 1966 and one a few months later in November. Given the
major financial and organizational implications of the proposals for munici-
palities, cantons, and the federal administration, this was a tight schedule.20
The first commission meeting was marked by sharp questioning and ob-
jections from the municipalities and the cantons. Adolf Ballmer, head of the
Basel-Landschaft employment office and later president of the Association of
Swiss Employment Offices, criticized the working group’s proposals. He
wondered whether a new method via the data center would be able to elimi-
nate the main source of error, namely, the way the different communities
collected their data. Some of them recorded the place of work, others the
place of residence. Among other things, this practice would lead to outdated
numbers or double counting. Ballmer spoke out in favor of harmonizing the
cantons’ data collection procedures. But he saw the decentralized federal
structure of Switzerland’s migration regime as an insurmountable hurdle.21
Marc Virot, head of the cantonal aliens police in Bern and president of
the Association of Aliens Police, pointed out an important distinction: per-
mits were counted, not foreigners. In most cases the data came from written
reports from employers and landlords, not from the persons concerned
themselves. In contrast to the authorities in the cantons and municipalities,
the federal administration not only rarely came into direct contact with the
persons affected but was also unaware of the consequences of its policies for
the local authorities.22
Moreover, although the representatives of the cantons must have known
that the Federal Council would be cutting back their powers even further in
future, Virot could not imagine automating and standardizing the reporting
system in view of the cantonal differences. It would certainly be easier for the
central authority if the forms were uniformly designed. He did not believe,
however, that the cantons could agree on uniform punched cards, as there
20 BAR, Minutes of the 1st Meeting; E7001C#1978/59#954*, Minutes of the 2nd Ses-
sion of the Expert Commission for Statistics on Foreigners.
21 BAR, Minutes of the 1st Meeting.
22 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 73
were great differences, especially with regard to reported mutations
(changes) in foreigners’ records.23
The internal administrative working group reacted to these objections
with slightly revised proposals, which they sent out only shortly before the
second meeting. It was also decided to hold an extensive tour of the Comput-
ing Center before the second meeting in order to convince the commission
members of the new technology. Subsequently, the statisticians took into ac-
count the concerns expressed at the first meeting. During the trial run, the
existing statistics would certainly be continued. The switch to the new system
would only be made when all concerns had been dispelled and flawless oper-
ation could be guaranteed.24
Commission chairman Keller also assured the group that the report was
to be understood as a draft. The meeting dragged on until late afternoon.
Provided that a trial run was carried out, the representatives of the cantons
and municipalities agreed with the verdict that the new statistics on foreign-
ers were technically possible. During the discussion, however, they noted that
time would be short even if cantons and municipalities could be legally com-
pelled to participate in the trial run. A working solution would surely take
more time. Keller took a different view and announced that there would be
no further meetings.25
As the minutes show, an extensive trial run was particularly a concern
for the large municipalities and cantons, which had already automated their
resident registration and aliens police authorities or were about to do so.
They feared that a centralized registration process could lead to further shifts
in competence toward the federal state. Before the report could be accepted
by all members of the commission, a lengthy consultation process was neces-
sary. Finally, the representatives of the cantons and municipalities expressed
their support, as the final version of the report stated that various technical
and organizational problems had yet to be clarified because the time avail-
able was too short or the analysis of the problems would be too costly. It was
23 Ibid.
24 BAR, Minutes of the 2nd Session.
25 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
74 Moritz Mähr
also noted that reliable functioning of the statistics depended on thoroughly
training the community.26
The promise of an automated migration policy was a rather vague and
fragile compromise. Moreover, during the work of the commission the fronts
had hardened. On one side were the administrators and planners of the fed-
eral administration who preferred a quick, technical solution to a political
problem and were convinced of the top-down approach. On the other side
were the representatives of the cantons and municipalities who could imag-
ine neither that anything would change in the legal status quo – the exten-
sive competences of the cantons – nor that a quick technical solution to the
political migration problem was possible. The new statistics on foreigners de-
pended on acceptance by local authorities and would only be successful if
adapted to their processes and structures. However, little of this conflict was
evident in the final report.
A final report, but still many questions
In March 1967 the report was distributed to all the authorities involved. The
new statistics on foreigners were to combine the labor market statistics col-
lected by the Employment Office since 1949 and the social statistics collected
by the Aliens Police since 1964. None of the existing statistics represented
the total number of foreigners living and working in Switzerland. The labor
market statistics lacked non-employed foreigners. Social statistics did not in-
clude foreigners with short-term residence permits or cross-border com-
muters, who were not subject to mandatory checks. This gap in data collec-
tion would become even wider due to the new provisions of the migration
agreement with Italy. The experts reckoned that in future more foreigners
would have to be released from the obligation to undergo checks and that
more non-employed foreigners would settle in Switzerland as a result of sim-
26 BAR, Minutes of the 1st Meeting; Minutes of the 2nd Session. Basel City already
had a system in place in the mid-1970s that allowed recording of population mutations
on screen and in real time. State Archives Basel-Stadt, FD-REG 8a 2–2 (1) 15/2, Project
Group Population On-Line Mutations. BAR, Minutes of the 1st Meeting, First Draft; Re-
port of the Expert Commission, Second Draft.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 75
plified family reunification. The new statistics on foreigners should therefore
cover all foreigners residing in Switzerland.27
The low collection rate of existing statistics was also seen as a problem
by the Expert Commission. Since the 1960s, the Federal Council had been
intervening more and more in cantonal labor market and admissions policy.
The interventions were defined and implemented by the Employment Office.
For this purpose, reliable and regularly collected statistics were needed. The
new statistics on foreigners had to be updated on an ongoing basis. Ideally, at
the end of every month, electronic processing would enable quick production
of a detailed analysis.28
The structure of the new statistics on foreigners provided that all for-
eigners, i. e., all non-Swiss nationals with work, residence and settlement per-
mits, be recorded in the system on a key date and the data stored on magnet-
ic tape. In a next step, the data was to be compared with the data of the
Social Security Register in Geneva and adjusted. Based on this «master tape»,
changes would be entered on an ongoing basis. In addition, statistical analy-
ses tailored to «factual and temporal» needs were to be produced each
month and shared with the cantons, municipalities, and federal authorities.29
This scenario was hypothetical for logistical reasons alone: the likeli-
hood of being able to count one million foreigners or their permits on a spe-
cific date was at best illusory, even with the support of the cantons. Compar-
ing this data against that of the Social Security Register was also wishful
thinking. Although the Social Security Register wanted to acquire a computer
for automatic processing, the planning was not very far advanced. This natu-
rally left unanswered the question of how the data would be transferred from
Bern to Geneva. Networking the two offices via a dedicated line was not even
on the horizon. And transmission in paper form or by telephone was not
only costly but also prone to errors.30
27 BAR, Report of the Expert Commission.
28 BAR, Report of the Expert Commission. Jost has examined in detail the prominent
role of the Employment Office vis-à-vis Swiss economic and social statistics and describes
it as autonomous and very close to the economy. Jost, Von Zahlen, Politik und Macht,
pp. 94–97.
29 BAR, Report of the Expert Commission.
30 BAR, Minutes of the 2nd Session.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
76 Moritz Mähr
The choice of method for keeping the register, too, showed that the ex-
perts were unconcerned about data logistics. The «permanent inventory»
method originated in accounting and required that all inventory data be kept
centrally and on-site in Bern. In addition, new information or changes had to
be continuously collected and transferred to the master tape every evening.
This procedure was intended to guarantee that the data on the master tape
was always up-to-date. It should also lead to a low error rate, as it was rare
for two changes to be made to the same personal data record on the same
day.31
Based on this daily updated master data set, the statistical analyses
would then be carried out. The following questions would be answered daily:
How many foreigners stayed or settled in the canton in a given year? How
many of them were children? How many adults? What was the change in
foreign population compared to the previous year? What were their coun-
tries of origin? How many foreigners with a residence permit were gainfully
employed? How many foreigners with a settlement permit were gainfully
employed? In which sectors were they employed? What professions did they
pursue? These were mainly questions relating to the structure of the labor
market.
The expert report also stipulated that entries and changes should be
recorded in the municipalities and cantons and only be transmitted to the
Computing Center in Bern for processing. It was argued that both the initial
entry and the ongoing changes could be checked for accuracy more quickly
locally, because it was often necessary to contact employers and landlords to
verify the data. The short physical distance and the knowledge of local pecu-
liarities seemed a compelling argument. The experts were also convinced that
centralizing the collection of data would lead to an excessive increase in the
number of staff in Bern.32
Decentralized data collection meant that the communes and cantons
would not send forms with registration or change notifications to the Aliens
Police. Instead, they would independently transfer the completed forms to an
electronically processable medium. In this way, all registration and change
31 BAR, Report of the Expert Commission.
32 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 77
notifications would be collected in the respective offices and transferred to
punched cards or magnetic tape. At the end of the month, these would be
sent to the Computing Center in a collective consignment. The Computing
Center would receive all entry and change notifications from the various of-
fices and process them electronically on an ongoing basis. A few days later,
stock lists would be printed out for each office and statistical analyses would
be conducted. These analyses would then be made available to the offices by
post. The report makes no mention of the frequency of analysis for the Em-
ployment Office or the Aliens Police.33
The report estimated the personnel requirement for the register at forty
to sixty employees. About twenty of them were alphabet punchers. The total
costs would amount to over two million Swiss francs. Even for a short report
of 21 pages, these were extremely vague estimates of expenditure. Trained
personnel in the field of electronic data processing were very rare and expen-
sive. The experts were aware that in times of a shortage of skilled workers in
the IT sector, it was unclear whether enough qualified personnel could be
found. Moreover, the new statistics on foreigners would become one of the
most expensive automation projects of the entire civil federal administra-
tion.34
The experts did not share the Organizational Staff’s doubts about the
legal foundation. They saw a sufficient basis for the first survey in the Statis-
tics Act of 23 July 1870. For the operation of the register and the recording of
current changes, the Aliens Police were given sufficient authority by Article
23, Paragraph l of the Federal Act of 26 March 1931 on the Residence and
Settlement of Foreigners.35
The consensus expressed in the final report of the Expert Commission
was relatively sparse. All members agreed that the current labor market and
social statistics were inadequate and that better statistics should be produced
as soon as possible. There was considerable disagreement on how such statis-
tics and data collection should be implemented, apart from a few technical
specifications such as centralized data management and the register manage-
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
78 Moritz Mähr
ment method. The federal administration seemed confident that political
pressure from the over-foreignization initiative would pave the way for a new
technical solution. The cantons and municipalities seemed convinced that
the legal status quo would remain intact and that the cantons could continue
to implement their own entry policies. For this reason, the final report left
important technical and organizational questions open, in particular ques-
tions of data logistics, which are central to an information infrastructure.
The Federal Council retakes control
The authorities involved were obviously keen to circulate the Expert Com-
mission’s report as soon as possible. Thanks in part to the popular initiative,
for which the Federal Council was busy formulating a recommendation, the
subject of over-foreignization was omnipresent. The Employment Office and
the Aliens Police wished to exploit the momentum and urged the Federal
Council to proceed with the new statistics on foreigners. It was imperative to
launch a trial run of the new statistics on foreigners in a small area as soon as
possible. The outcome should then serve as the basis for a decision on the
overall project.
In the meantime, Elmar Mäder, director of the Aliens Police, applied for
twelve full-time positions at the beginning of April to introduce the new
statistics on foreigners. In the application he also mentioned that the circular
letter of 1 January 1967 had already centralized the statistical recording of
newly issued residence permits for non-active foreigners. For this policy, an
application for an increase in personnel by two full-time positions had al-
ready been submitted in the middle of the previous year. In this way, the
Aliens Police had moved forward and tried to set precedents for the institu-
tional integration of the new statistics on foreigners.36
By then, all the agencies involved as well as the Federal Department of
Justice and the Federal Finance Administration had weighed in on the expert
report. With the exception of the Employment Office and the Aliens Police,
all the authorities were critical. Precise deadlines and a detailed budget were
lacking. In view of the high costs, a well-planned trial operation was essential
36 BAR, E6270B-01#1981/186#206*, Letter of 10 April 1967.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 79
but could not be implemented in the foreseeable future. Too many technical
and organizational questions were still unresolved. In addition to the resis-
tance of other authorities, the over-foreignization initiative began to lose
support, and the pressure to implement vigorous measures to restrict migra-
tion eased. On 29 June 1967, the Federal Council recommended that the ini-
tiative be rejected and announced a policy to restrict immigration. The new
measures included a quota of foreign workers for each company that was
calculated on the basis of previous years and could not be exceeded. New
statistics on foreigners were unnecessary for these measures.37
The Aliens Police and the Employment Office wished to implement the
new statistics on foreigners as quickly as possible and pushed ahead with
their departments without authorization. Consequently, disagreement be-
tween the Department of Economic Affairs and the Department of Justice
arose. In a strongly worded communication, Mäder and Holzer were urged
to stick to official channels. No personnel budget would be discussed until
further notice. This was a defeat for the Aliens Police and the Employment
Office. The Statistical Office now profited from this discord. As it was neither
part of the Department of Justice nor the Department of Economics, but
rather the Department of the Interior, it was able to act as an independent
and impartial party. The Federal Council instructed the Statistical Office to
clarify the costs of the trial run and continuous operation as well as the open
technical and organizational questions.
At the beginning of January 1968, the Statistical Office began to collect,
prioritize, and process the questions that the expert report had left open. Af-
ter the Aliens Police and the Employment Office had made many decisions
on their own initiative, the process now returned to the official channels of
the administration. Other authorities were involved from the outset, and the
administrative procedures and protocols were followed. This was explicitly
recorded in the minutes. Only when all points had been clarified should the
37 Amtsdruckschriften, Volksbegehren gegen die Überfremdung. Bericht des Bundes-
rates, Vol. 4, Bern 1967, pp. 529–546.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
80 Moritz Mähr
new working group prepare its report. The draft was to be submitted to all
authorities involved.38
When the Federal Council implemented the already announced restric-
tive measures on 28 February, the concern about Switzerland’s over-foreig-
nization initiative seemed to fade again. A few days after this announcement,
the National Action withdrew its popular initiative. But the calm was short-
lived. There was disagreement within the National Action about how to pro-
ceed. On 15 May 1968, James Schwarzenbach, a member of the National
Council representing the National Action, launched a second, more radical
over-foreignization initiative called the Schwarzenbach initiative. In contrast
to the first popular initiative, the new initiative contained no withdrawal
clause. In addition, the wording was more precise to make it harder to inter-
pret the constitutional article in an immigration-friendly manner. This initia-
tive gave new momentum to the discussion on new statistics on foreigners.
In October 1968, the Statistical Office submitted the first preliminary
report of just under four pages to the Federal Council. The responses were
brief and diplomatic. It would be possible to compile the statistics required
by the Aliens Police and the Employment Office. The most fundamental reg-
istration offices would be the resident registration offices in the municipali-
ties. The Aliens Police would act as a central collection and control point,
coordinating the exchange of data with the cantons and communes. The
Computing Center would run the new information system, carrying out the
analyses and taking over the punching and checking of the documents. Thus
were the most important open questions answered. A time schedule for the
trial run could be determined, and the costs would not exceed the estimates
of the expert report.39
The Federal Council decided to continue its investigation of the Statisti-
cal Office. In only three months, the Statistical Office, the Employment Of-
fice, and the Aliens Police agreed on a compromise solution. In January 1969
they submitted their final report to the Federal Council. A Central Aliens
38 BAR, E3321–01#1985/36#47*, Memorandum to the Meeting of 15 January 1968 on
the Procedure for Clarifying Open Questions in the Report of the Expert Commission for
Statistics on Foreigners.
39 BAR, E3321–01#1985/36#47*, New Statistics on Foreigners.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 81
Register was to be created (Fig. 3). The Aliens Police would be given the lead
responsibility for this project. Together with the Employment Office and the
Computing Center, the Aliens Police would prepare various interim reports
for the Federal Council: the first after discussions with the cantons and com-
munes, and the second after trial runs with selected cantons. Both reports
were to be submitted within one year.40
With this proposal, the Federal Council defused the conflict that had
arisen between the federal administration and the cantons and municipali-
ties. A one-year trial run would be carried out. All authorities involved were
to be given a say. Expenditures would be distributed as evenly as possible
between the Computing Center, the Aliens Police, and the cantons. Respon-
sibility for the project was to be transferred to the smallest authority within
the federal administration. In addition, the cantons and municipalities were
to be given a voice by being an integral part of the co-reporting procedure
and the pilot phase.41
The report also contained a timetable that showed not only the project
milestones but also an estimated distribution of expenditures over the com-
ing years. The total amounts did not differ significantly from the estimates in
previous reports, but the costs were broken down more precisely and com-
pensation for the local authorities was defined.42
What the report did not contain, however, was a clarification of the
pressing legal issues. The Statistical Office was still convinced that neither the
Statistics Act nor the Federal Law on the Residence and Settlement of For-
eigners provided a sufficient legal basis. In the report these concerns were
reduced to a statement that the legal basis would be sufficient, provided the
Federal Council adopted the information system by the end of January 1970.
The question of which laws would have to be created and whether this would
limit the competence of the cantons was not raised. The timetable for the
information system seemed to have been adapted to the political situation.
40 BAR, E3325–02#2013/10#23*, Activity Reports of the Computing Center; BAR,
E3321–01#1985/36#62*, Co-Reporting Procedure; E3321–01#1985/36#84*, Summary Fi-
nal Report.
41 BAR, Summary Final Report.
42 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
82 Moritz Mähr
Fig. 3: Technical draft titled «Rough Solution for Preliminary Project» for the new statistics
on foreigners (Swiss Federal Archives, E3325–02#2013/10#146*).
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 83
The second over-foreignization initiative, which aimed to radically limit mi-
gration, enjoyed a great deal of popular support. The Federal Council feared
that approval of the initiative would mean major economic losses for
Switzerland. The government was under increasing pressure.
Promise gives way to reality in the cantons
On 28 January 1970, the Federal Council commissioned the ZAR informa-
tion system and, with a budget of over two million Swiss francs, approved
the most expensive statistical information system to date. The mandate also
included drawing up the missing legal basis for operating ZAR. In so doing,
the Federal Council followed the final report of 1969 in all important points.
The return to official channels and the political pressure exerted by the pop-
ular initiative had led the Federal Council to approve the trial operation. All
on condition that the cantons and municipalities were involved in the imple-
mentation process from the outset.43
Meanwhile, the public debate continued to intensify in the context of
the Schwarzenbach initiative. On 16 March 1970, the Federal Council re-
sponded to the pressure and tightened entry regulations for foreign workers
throughout Switzerland. The nationwide restriction on immigration stipulat-
ed that foreign workers should be fairly distributed among the cantons ac-
cording to economic and demographic needs. The labor market statistics of
the Employment Office and the social statistics of the Aliens Police were
used as the basis for calculating the distribution formula. In other words, the
statistics were still compiled by hand at irregular intervals, a process that was
too inaccurate and too slow in the opinion of everyone involved. The expla-
nation was that the new statistics based on ZAR were still the subject of ex-
tensive planning meetings with cantons and municipalities.44
The negotiations with the cantons and the largest municipalities were a
great challenge for a small federal authority like the Aliens Police. It did not
have the necessary knowledge to negotiate the technical and organizational
details of the upcoming trial run. A ZAR working group was set up to chan-
43 Ibid.
44 BAR, E3321–01#1985/36#103, Guidelines for Filling in Registration Forms.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
84 Moritz Mähr
nel the negotiations. This body, consisting of members of the Aliens Police,
the Employment Office, the Statistical Office, and representatives of the can-
tons and communes, met at irregular but sometimes very short intervals. The
group exchanged views on the work to be done and made technical and or-
ganizational decisions concerning the register.45
Most of the time in the meetings was spent resolving issues related to
migration authority work in general, with little impact on ZAR: How should
foreigners who left Switzerland or changed cantons without signing off be
recorded? Should employers and landlords be obliged to report sign-offs to
the authorities in addition to registration? How could small municipalities
with part-time staff cope with the administrative burden? Could families
continue to be registered using the family form, or did a separate form have
to be completed for each person? Were the fees for the cantons and com-
munes of 70 centimes for the initial registration and 20 centimes for the noti-
fication of a change appropriate?46
The discussions revolved around the everyday problems of the authori-
ties on the front line. The only technical artifacts that were discussed very
intensively were the new, uniformly designed, machine-readable forms for
the initial and change notifications. The forms not only provided a semantic
platform for the cantonal and municipal authorities to agree on common
processes and interfaces but also represented the interface to ZAR as data
supplier. Most of the authorities concerned would fill in the notifications by
hand and send them by mail to the Aliens Police in Bern. Only a handful of
authorities, mostly from large municipalities, expressed any interest at all in
automated data transfer. The representatives of the Aliens Police were cer-
tain that authorities that already had an automated and centralized control
system in place or were planning to do so would not cause any major prob-
lems in connecting to ZAR. Rather, the police worried about the smaller au-
thorities, which processed everything by hand.47
The discussions took more time than expected, while the Federal Coun-
cil pressed for the trial run to take place earlier than planned. Both the Aliens
45 BAR, E3321–01#1985/36#84, Report to the Federal Council of 3 December 1970.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 85
Police and the Computing Center had overstretched themselves and were
working at the limits of their capacity. The performance requirements for
ZAR, as formulated a few years earlier by the Employment Office and the
Aliens Police, had to be continually adjusted: registration of cross-border
commuters, automatic assignment of AHV (old-age insurance system) num-
bers, and several tabular programs for special statistics were postponed to a
later project phase. The goals of the federal authorities were pushed to the
background. The success of the project depended solely on whether current
and reliable figures from the cantons and municipalities could be compiled
during the trial run.
The trial run itself was a balancing act. On the one hand, the technical
feasibility had to be demonstrated; on the other hand, the new system had to
be accepted by the cantons and municipalities. Without the full support of
the cantons, it would not be possible to meet the schedule. Making the trial
run as realistic as possible from a political and technical point of view, small
as well as large, and manually as well as automatically, required the partici-
pation of the operating authorities. Various cantons made themselves avail-
able, and the final choice was made for Lucerne, Basel City, Grisons, and
Neuchâtel. It was a balanced, Helvetic selection. Lucerne represented Catho-
lic-conservative Central Switzerland, Basel was a large industrial city with a
technically advanced population control system, Grisons was a large and ru-
ral canton from the south of Switzerland, and Neuchâtel represented the
French-speaking part of the country.48
On 4 March 1971 the Aliens Police announced the ambitious timetable
for the trial run. Within just one month, the four cantons were to clarify the
organization and evaluate training materials for staff. From May to August,
employees were to be trained in the municipalities. An inventory of all for-
eigners subject to controls in the canton of Lucerne was to be drawn up as
early as 1 September. The other cantons would follow in the last quarter of
the year. This meant stress not only for the test cantons but also for the Ali-
ens Police and the Computing Center. The forms, envelopes, and training
materials had to be printed in sufficient quantities after the final editing and
distributed to the cantons. Adjustments to the forms or the survey process
48 Ibid.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
86 Moritz Mähr
always meant programming work for the Computing Center and could delay
the trial by several weeks. In addition, the Aliens Police had to formulate and
circulate the rules applicable to the cantons by circular letter.49
The Aliens Police quickly reached the limits of its capacity with the
planning of the trial run. The situation came to a head because politicians
and the Federal Council were pushing the pace. In order to avert acceptance
of the Schwarzenbach initiative, effective policies had to be defined quickly
and their effectiveness demonstrated with up-to-date figures. For these rea-
sons, the technical issues took a back seat and the planning of the trial run
focused primarily on migration police matters. These compromises served to
water down the vision of an automated migration policy and signaled a re-
turn to the slow and incremental change that the federal system was accus-
tomed to.
Conclusion
The planning of the ZAR information system was characterized as a negotia-
tion process between the federal administration and the cantons and munici-
palities on the design of Switzerland’s federal migration regime. The plann-
ing process for the information infrastructure and especially its technical
artifacts provided a platform for presenting the expectations of the various
stakeholders and agreeing on a consensus solution. This process did not pro-
ceed in a linear fashion, but in phases marked by sharp breaks.
In a first phase from 1964 to 1967, the federal administration dominated
the discussion in the person of Employment Office director Max Holzer. The
vision of automating migration policy appeared to Holzer to be feasible in
view of the pressure from both domestic and foreign policy. In 1964 a new
treaty with Italy committed Switzerland to unifying its migration regime in
favor of foreign workers, and the National Action’s xenophobic popular ini-
tiative led to a tightening of migration regulations. Holzer was convinced
that sooner or later the cantons would forfeit their constitutional right to is-
sue work, residence, and settlement permits. He wanted to anticipate this de-
49 BAR, E4300C-01#1998/299#31*, 1st Meeting with the Trial Cantons of 4 March
1971; E3321–01#1985/36#103*, Circular Letter from the Aliens Police of 1 July 1971.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 87
velopment with a technical solution and set a precedent. His approach
seemed to overestimate political pressure and underestimate the power of the
federal status quo.
The solution proposed in the final report of 1967 had been worked out
mainly on the drawing boards of the federal administration’s statisticians. It
required centralized structures and took little account of the realities of the
federal periphery. The redesign of the federal migration regime was seen not
as a political problem but as a technical one. The description of the new in-
formation system in administrative and technical terms made it difficult to
involve the cantons and the municipalities in the planning process. The tech-
nical description deflected attention from the political consequences of this
information system and the corresponding policies for the parties.
But precisely where the information system interfered with the process-
es and organizational structures of the authorities in the cantons and munici-
palities, there was great resistance to automation. The new migration policy
that the technical design required was perceived by those involved as political
rather than technical. In the eyes of the cantons and municipalities, too
much power and data were concentrated in Bern. The new system was in
conflict with the constitution, which placed work, residence, and settlement
permits within the jurisdiction of the cantons. The Employment Office and
the Aliens Police tried to ignore these concerns. Moreover, in order to reach
a consensus as quickly as possible, important organizational and technical
issues were excluded from the discussion and postponed until trial operation.
The indeterminate nature of the report and the haste with which the
Aliens Police took action were the main reasons the Federal Council inter-
vened in 1967 and transferred project management to the Statistical Office.
The Statistical Office was part of the Federal Department of the Interior and
thus independent of the Department of Economics and the Department of
Justice. It concentrated on technical implementation and, in contrast to the
Employment Office and the Aliens Police, was not involved in renegotiating
Switzerland’s federal migration regime at the policy level.
Thus, between 1967 and 1969 a solution was found which was also vi-
able for the cantons. Not much remained of the visionary claim to automate
migration policy. The information system was to replace the existing statis-
tics without major adjustments in the cantons and municipalities. The opera-
tion of the register was to be entrusted to the smallest federal authority in-
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
88 Moritz Mähr
volved, the Aliens Police. In addition, the local authorities would be adequ-
ately compensated for their efforts and the federal administration would take
care of local training. The demand for radical control of migration flows had
given way to the federal reality in which cantons and the federal administra-
tion negotiated a compromise.
In 1970, the pressure on the Federal Council increased. The Schwarzen-
bach initiative, which would have capped the population share of foreigners
at 10 % and would have forced hundreds of thousands of people to return to
their home countries, found broad support among the voters and threatened
to pass. On 28 January 1970, the Federal Council gave the green light for the
new information system and demanded that the trial run be implemented
sooner than planned. On 16 March, the Federal Council decided on a rela-
tively radical, nationwide restriction on immigration. The policy was aimed
at reassuring voters and preventing passage of the Schwarzenbach initiative.
The policy required calculating the maximum number of aliens to be admitt-
ed on a monthly basis. These quotas could then be fairly divided among all
the cantons. As long as ZAR was not yet fully operational, the old «over-
foreignization statistics» of the Aliens Police were to be used as a basis for
calculating the quotas. Even before the trial run had begun, ZAR was already
an integral part of an important policy. This also meant that any decision
taken in the trial run would have direct consequences.
The trial run was planned for 1971. The time leading up to it was
marked by further negotiations on the design of Switzerland’s federal migra-
tion regime. The federal administration as well as the cantons and munici-
palities now had to agree on specific protocols and processes. In the discus-
sions on data logistics and the interfaces to the ZAR information system, the
basic features of an information infrastructure that would be in place until
2008 were defined. Many discussions revolved around technical artifacts
such as machine-readable forms that could be filled out in pencil, and how to
deal with inquiries about data. For most cantons and municipalities, forms
were the most important interface for exchanging data, alongside the tele-
phone. In 1974 the trial run was completed and ZAR was put into regular
operation. This completed the planning but not the development of ZAR. As
an information infrastructure that was in daily use by various authorities, it
had to adapt not only to the changing policies of a highly dynamic federal
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89
On planning an information system in the Swiss federal administration in the 1960s 89
migration regime but also to technological changes that shaped the organiza-
tion and operation of the federal administration.
The planning of the information infrastructure for ZAR was not a linear
process, nor was it done by the book. At no time were the requirements con-
clusively defined; the system design was developed only shortly before the
trial run and had to be adapted several times during it. Rather, infrastructure
planning for ZAR was a process of negotiation that engaged various actors
over several years and was subject to the vagaries of politics and technologi-
cal change. Various technical artifacts played a decisive role in this process.
What was decisive was not the frictions and barriers created by the specific
nature of ZAR. What was decisive was that the technical artifacts offered a
semantic platform for the negotiation process. The forms, data logistics, pro-
cesses, and protocols from the daily work of the migration authorities offered
tangible subjects for discussion. In contrast, the promise of an automated mi-
gration regime, which was dominant in the early planning phase, was merely
a project space filled with the desires of all involved parties.
Itinera 49, 2022, 60–89